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Abstract. Architectural attacks are kinds of hardware-involved software attacks in
which a software component misuse a privileged relationship with the hardware to by
pass system protections, monitors, or forensic tools. These relationships are often
not illegal and exist between system components by design. Hence, even a system
with secure hardware and software components, can be architecturally vulnerable.
Unfortunately, the existing threat modeling schemes are not applicable for modeling
architectural attacks against computing platforms. This is mostly because the existing
techniques rely on an abstract representation of a software (.e.g., Data Flow Diagram)
as a primary requirement which is not available for a platform as a whole (considering
both hardware and software elements). In this paper, we have discussed the necessity
of a hardware-software architectural view to system threat modeling. Then, we have
proposed Lamellae, a framework adapts threat modeling method to be applicable
for untrusted platforms by a holistic approach. Lamellae involves system security
architecture for abstract modeling of the platforms. Using the Design structure
matrix analysis, Lamellae helps an end-user to identify possible attack vectors against
a platform. The framework is a connection point of concepts from system engineering
and software security domains. We have applied the framework on a multi-purpose
computer with x86-64 architecture as a case-study to show the effectiveness of our
framework.
Keywords: Architectural attacks · System engineering · Threat modeling · Attack
taxonomy · Design structure matrix · System security architecture · Platform security
· Advanced persistent threat · Security engineering · Hardware-involved software
attacks.
1 Introduction
Today it is hard to find any office, and industrial or medical center devoid of computing
systems. Considering the serious consequences of cyber-attacks against such systems,
preventive measures such as evaluating the security before deploying them in the field, is
essential.
We have witnessed a significant growth in low-level state-of-the-art attacks [ZSL+15][BD12]
[SCK+16] [LKV+13] against low-level components of computing platforms (including op-
erating systems, VMM reference monitors, firmware, and even the hardware), in past
two decades. This is while existing security solutions (e.g. host-based intrusion detection
[LZO10][Hu10], and malware detection [ALVW10][EMO12], [SLGM12]) mostly concentrate
on the security threats or vulnerability of application-level programs.
Hence a critical question is how the existing threats against these platforms are modeled
to evaluate the security. The conventional answer includes software threat modeling efforts
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[Sho14] which is an accepted practice for predicting different attacks against a software
element as early as possible in its life cycle. These efforts which can be done either by the
developer or the end-user have rich literature and variety of tools to assess the security of
an application against different user-level and kernel-level malicious attacks.
Sufficing to this software-only threat modeling procedure means that we have assumed
other hardware components of the platform to be in the trusted computing base (TCB).
Traditionally this has been a common assumption during security analysis.
The assumption looks to be no more acceptable when considering recent state-of-
the-art "Hardware-INvolved Software" [For11] (HINS) attacks. HINS attacks may in-
volve hardware at micro-architecture [SCK+16] [LSG+18] [KGG+18] or architecture
[SCK+16][LSG+18][KGG+18] levels. Since the software cannot easily interact with the
hardware, microarchitectural attacks include complex side-channel data leaks based on
prioir knowledge of CPU microarchitecture. However, there are a broad range of more
straight-forward attacks in which software misuse its legitimate access to hardware compo-
nents of the system directly to apply any modification directly.
Architectural attack is a name for indicating such later multi-stage attacks misusing
architectural features as noted by Zhang et al.[ZZS+18]. The origin for such attacks is some
inconsistencies occur in cooperation of some components at HW-SW boundary. These
include, as Letan et al. point, situation where every component seems to be working as
expected, but their composition creates an attack path[LRGCH18]. Hence, even a system
with secure hardware and software components, can be architecturally vulnerable.
Although defedending against a single architectural attack does not need a new per-
ception, analyzing the big picture may need. Due to increasing rate of such attacks in
the current decade, we have witnessed a newfound research trend [LRGCH18][LCH+16]
[ZZS+18] toward bringing up a holistic defensive approach to cover such threats. Hence,
there have been no threat modeling framework available for such attacks which is the focus
of this paper.
The inherent cross-layer nature of such attacks involve multiple components of a system
in a complex scenario to conform a malicious mission. These cannot be easily identified by
per-element applying of attack mnemonics. More important, almost all of these models
rely on an abstract representation of their target as a primary requirement which is not
available for a computing platform as a whole.
In fact, one needs to consider all of HW/SW components of the platform and their
mutual relationships in order to be able to effectively evaluate the overall system security.
It is however not a trivial task to consider all platform components with all their relations
in a complex system. Considering the above noted points, we have to involve the system
architecture (which is by definition concerned with components and their relationships)
in the threat modeling process. System security architecture (SSA) is simply a view of
overall system architecture from a security perspective [Han05]. We believe that the SSA
concept has not been attended enough in the system security literature.
In this paper we have proposed a new framework for threat modeling of a system with
untrusted platform called "Lamellae". Accommodating current threat modeling practices
for a platform, Lamellae -which is a part of an ongoing research- has two main pillars:
A system-centric approach to inter-component relationships through the platform and
an abstract representation of the platform based on these relationships to achieve the
platform’s SSA.
• Adopting the existing threat modeling method in order to be applicable for predicting
different rootkits and architecturall vulnerabilities in computing platforms (combi-
nation of software and hardware elements). This includes proposing a DSM-based
system security architecture representation, a taxonomy for inter-component relations
misused by attackers, and set of matrix-based metrics to find potential attack vectors.
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• Applying the model on an X86-64 general purpose system as a case study and
evaluating the study by some revealed Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks.
In the remainder of the paper, after presenting a brief review of the related literature
in section 2, we will see the details of Lamellae in section 3. We will then elaborate on
the use of the proposed framework to threat modeling of a sample system with x86-64
architecture as a case-study, in section 4. In section 5 we have evaluated the study by some
APT attacks disclosed in recent years. Finally, sections 6 and 7 will include discussion and
conclusion, respectively.
2 Related works
2.1 Threat modeling
Threat modeling is a traditional practice in software security (from 1977) with rich
literature and tools [Sho14]. In recent years, there have been efforts toward adopting threat
modeling for security assessment of more complex targets other than a single application.
Cyber-physical systems [YHK+12][MBK+15][ACYA17], Autonoumous systems [Win17],
cloud infrastructure[AWJS16], embedded systems [AGK15] are examples of fields borrowed
the concept of threat modeling in their security evaluation process.
The most similar approach to the Lamellae could be seen in [ACYA17] which has been
proposed by Almohri et al. in the context of Medical Cyber-Physical Systems (MCPS).
The authors have proposed their own threat model as well as a basic abstract architecture
for MCPS environments. However, like other researches exist, the platform-level threats
mentioned in [ACYA17] is too limited and lack a comprehensive view.
2.2 Security architecture
An abstract definition of security architecture defines it as a high level identification and
describtion of components involved in providing system’s security requirements [LV03].
Security architecture frameworks has often been studied in the context of enterprise
architecture (EA). In this context security architecture describes "a structured inter-
relationship between the technical and procedural solutions to support the long-term needs
of the business" [SCL95]. SABSA [She05] is a well-known example of such frameworks
which are surveyed well in [BSS10].
These security architecture frameworks have been also extended to be used in specific
technological domains. Chang et al. [CR16] have considered security requirements of a
cloud software (SaaS) in different phases of its life cycle (design, implementation, and test)
to provide a data security framework for cloud environment. The security framework which
is based on a multi-layered model called CCAF [CKR16] embodies data attack spectrum
and also the technologies can be used to mitigate such attacks in a three-layer layout. The
layers include access-control, identity management, and encryption.
Trustcloud [KJM+11] is another example proposed in the context of accountability in
cloud computing domain. The framework considers five layers of abstraction including
system, data, work-flow, regulations, and policies. Each layer is responsible for recording
special logs which are required for providing accountability.
RAJAMKI [RAJ16] proposed a design theory for resilient cyber-physical systems. The
main component of the theory is a multi-layered reference architecture covering the human,
software (cyber) and platform (physical) layers. Hahn et al. [HTLC15] have proposed
a security analysis framework for cyber-physical systems. The framework includes a
layered architecture of such systems as well as a kill-chain model represents the security
attacks. Mapping the kill-chain to the three-layer architecture (including cyber, control,
and physical layers), enable the framework to analyze the security of the target system.
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(a) Main steps for Lamellae threat modeling frame-
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(b) Overall insight of the Lamellae DSM ma-
trix
Figure 1: Overall view on Lamellae framework.
All mentioned frameworks - though considered the computing platform in their
architectures- are such coarse-grained that they cannot be used in order to enumer-
ate threats between sub-components of the platform. In fact, there is no prior framework
for obtaining system security architecture (which is a concept with focus on a stand-alone
computer system and excludes network connections and also applications running on the
system [47]).
3 Lamellae framework
3.1 Motivation
The main motivation for the Lamellae raises as the result of an empirical study of different ar-
chitectural attacks (including but not limited to [ZSL+15][ESZ13][Hea06][WR11][LKV+13])
against computing platforms. The study shows that such attacks are leveraging a privi-
leged relationship between components inside the platform which are often not illegal and
exist between system’s components by design. These kinds of attacks are not considered
comprehensively neither in the existing attack taxonomies [SES+09][PSM+13] nor in threat
modeling schemes. Other than different kernel/user level rootkits [Bil09], there are a broad
range of attacks possible against lower components of the platform. Forristal has layed a
foundation for classifying different types of such attacks in [For11].
Threat modeling is a practice in security assessment of software application ecosystem.
Due to growing number of threats against computing platform, we think that it is necessary
to adapt such procedure in order to be applicable for platform’s security evaluation. This
would enable a security analyzer at the end-user party to predict possible attacks against
an in-hand platform. Hence would be possible to answer questions like:
• Which platform is less vulnerable to architectural attacks? (comparing multiple
platforms by their SSA)
• Which platform components are better locations to host a specific security solution
such that the solution cannot be bypassed?
• Is there any potential architectural attack vector against the (SW/HW) TPM on
this platform?
• Which hardware/software extensions are better to avoid (when possible) from the
security point of view?
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• Which hardware architecture is the most secure when using the specific operating
system of the enterprise?
3.2 Challenges
Threat modeling of a software include three steps done recursively: Modeling the software
via an abstract model like DFD, identifying threats (.e.g. using STRIDE[Tor05]), and
planning for mitigation of threats. In this practice either of threat modeling and mitigation
planning are often performed in a per-element manner. For example whenever you have
found an spoofing scenario, you can use authentication, signatures, tokens and similar
choices for the spoofed resource to mitigate the threat.
The first challenge of platform’s threat modeling scheme is to find an abstract view of
a whole platform covering all software, firmware, and hardware components. Data flow
diagrams and state machines are the most prevalent decomposition model used for software
application. Developers are asked to deliver the DFD of the target application in this step.
This challenge can be seen in other adoptions of threat modeling practices like those use
threat modeling in cyber-physical systems. As an example Yampolskiy et al.[YHK+12]
discuss the insufficiency of the DFD diagram elements for modeling such environments.
In the context of untrusted computing platforms, it is not a trivial task to achieve a
DFD when having a whole computing platform in hand. In fact, DFDs are not sufficient
as the platform security is highly concerned with control logic of the systems (Control
Flow Diagram). This is because the platform is responsible to implement control flow
redirections including API calls, interrupts, CPU mode changes, reconfiguration, and etc.
This is while there has been no available procedure for achieving exact DFD/CFD of
today’s complex platforms for an end-user.
The second challenge is to find an appropriate guidance for identifying platform threats.
Platform attacks are often multi-stage attacks involving multiple components of the system.
As was mentioned before, existing taxonomies [SES+09][PSM+13] don’t cover all kinds of
low-level platform attacks. Microsoft STRIDE also is not so helpful to guide the security
analyzer to enumerate such cross-layer state-of-the-art attacks.
3.3 Threat modeling
In this section we will accommodate the existing threat modeling procedure to be applicable
for untrusted computing platforms. Figure 1a shows the steps required for our framework
which are described in two following subsections.
3.3.1 Matrix formation
At the first step and in order to handle the first above challenge, we have introduced a
basic data-structure for indicating the System Security Architecture (SSA). The structure
can leverage different modeling perspectives 1.
Lamellae represent a platform by a simple structural modeling perspective in the
form of a squared N ∗N matrix called Design Structure Matrix (DSM). The structure is
consistent with the popular layered view of the system architecture in which upper layers
are less privileged. In addition, it has a rich supporting literature in the context of system
engineering.
Hence, we suggest to use the SSA-based DSM instead of DFD which is achievable by
information available to an end-user. SSA-based DSM can be seen as a more coarse-grained
representation which is applicable for platforms with different software and hardware
components.
1Including structural, functional, behavioral, Rule-based, Object-based, Communication, and Actor
and role perspectives[Kro12].
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Figure 1b shows the overall insight of the DSM matrix. Each system component
has a specific row and column in the matrix. The granularity of these components is
another decision point. Lamellae asks the user to consider standalone chips as a separated
hardware component. For software and firmware components, the user could consider
the independently developed code as separated components. We have suggested brief
best practices for helping an end-user to find such components in four main classes
including hardware, firmware, system software, and application-level components available
in appendix section. For ease of use, we will call any hardware, firmware, or software
component as a code execution unit.
Code execution units are the basic block for the DSM rows and columns. The internal
elements of the matrix should be filled by founded relations between different components.
The Xi,j element indicates that the j’th component has a kind of privileged relation to
apply some modifications on the i’th element. The privileged relation has been recognized
to be in the form of X category of the proposed taxonomy (Figure 2) will be explained in
continue .
Lamellae infer different types of relations based on possible attacks against platform. We
have performed an empirical study on the attacks against different platforms. In addition
to a large number of related papers found manually from the Google Scholar website, we
have tried to review related papers from the DBLP computer science bibliography database
(over 3.3 million publications till 2016). To choose related papers from the whole archive,
we have sufficed to about 220 unseen related titles . Considering each attack as a misuse of
a privileged relation between the ordered pair of (attacker, attacked) components, we have
found a generalization of such relations. Figure 2 shows our proposing taxonomy. Each
kind of privileged relation can potentially cause different types of system-level attacks.
The relations include:
1) Physical privileged relation: Any platform consists set of hardware components which
are arranged using some kinds of bus hierarchies. These hierarchies are often designed to
improve the performance of the whole system [Sta00][Hay02]. However, from the security
point of view the physical medium can be a source of physical man-in-the-middle attack.
In other words, the attacker resides in higher levels of bus, the hierarchy is physically
privileged over lower components and can modify the data owned by the component.
2) Logical privileged relation: Systems are designed so that they can provide the desired
abstraction for software developers. This is often implemented such that any code has
logical twins run in lower levels of the system. For example, when a Java application calls
for a system service, there may be codes in the interpreter as well as the operating system
which run in turn to execute the desired service. These twins which translate the more
abstract commands coming from their higher levels, can be implemented maliciously.
3) Sequential relation: Executable codes may form a partially ordered set based on the
time they run after the system turns on. This ordered relation may be valid continuously,
or temporary. The component which its code runs sooner, has the ability to apply its
desired changes without interception of the next components.
4) Configuration relation: Components which can change some system’s configurations
can cause attacks by decreasing security level during execution of other components. While
this kind of relations makes the system security analysis sophisticated, it is itself a result
of complexities and heterogeneity of the system design.
5) Control privileged relation: A system often includes some legal facilities to control,
manage or monitor some components. These control power often can be lever-aged by
malware developers for attacking the con-trolled component. In other word a counter
attack can occurs by the malicious controller itself.
6) Reflective privileged relation: Any code can be vulnerable to attacks sourced by
code running at same privilege level with similar access rights. For example, kernel drivers
can modify the OS kernel components as they both run at CPU kernel-mode.
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(a) A, B are coupled activ-
ities
(b) B has a removed tear, (c) B and C are conditional
activities depends to A
Figure 3: Different analysis concepts in the context of DSM analysis
7) Access privileged relation: The more coupling between system components, the more
mechanisms of interaction and access permission are needed to be defined in-between. The
system may include some components with no negligible levels of coupling as the result of
weak initial design or when providing extendability. These coupling and permitted access
rights between components can be misused in an attack scenario.
8) Protective relation: A component may be protected by the use of access control
or integrity checking mechanisms. Since the completeness of such protections could not
be proven formally in all situations, we consider a probability for the mechanism to be
bypassed.
Hence we have solved the second mentioned challenge by proposing our octet architec-
tural relationships which we believe can better reveal malicious activities through a given
platform.
One of the advantages of modeling the security relations between the platform compo-
nents based on these privileged accesses is that they can cover potential attacks which are
still not implemented for a specific platform. This is because the taxonomy is achieved by
generalizing the inherent nature of different kinds of platform attacks. However, it should
be noted that there would be no provable guarantee for these classes to cover any new
attack with new inherent characteristics. In fact, if we can imagine a new type of attack
which exploit a privilege relationship which does not exist in our taxonomy, it should be
used to update the taxonomy. After the update, all of different attacks with this new
characteristic are covered by Lamellae.
The order of rows (and their corresponding columns) is important in Lamellae. The
matrix should be arranged such that each row has some kind of privileged relation over
all its higher rows. This comes from the initial insight of the framework in which the
computing system is seen as a layered system in which lower layers are more privileged. In
the DSM literature, there are few rules to be applied on a raw DSM in order to ensure
that the units are chosen and arranged in the right order [EB12]:
• Sequencing rule: Similar to sequencing procedure for DSMs, we move rows and
columns such that the filled cells below the diagonal go to top of the diagonal or if
not possible as near as possible to it. Hence entities with empty columns and rows
(excluding elements on diagonal) should be shifted to the most right and left columns
respectively.
• Integration rule: Rows with identical marked columns will composed into a single
layer. The integrated units are called circuits in the context of DSM processing. There
have been multiple proposals for finding circuits inside a matrix [EB12][GE+91].
• Precedence rule: Row A will placed higher than row B if its filled cells are subset of
row B.
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3.3.2 Matrix analysis
After applying the rules, the final matrix which describes the security architecture of the
target system is ready. Hence we have achieved an architectural model of the platform.
In the next step we need to find threats for a specific given platform. In other word, we
should analyze the in-hand matrix to see "how can things go wrong"[Sho14]?
If the system shows a fully layered scheme (upper-triangular matrix), it is clear that the
platform would be more easy to be secured. This is because a probable security solution
placed in each layer can be attacked only by its lower layers. So most kinds of STRIDE
scenarios can be prevented by fixing monitors in the more privileged levels. By placing
a powerful monitor at the lowest trusted component one would theoretically be able to
monitor all components of the platform securely.
However, in most cases the system has some other relations below the diagonal. Hence,
possible attack vectors against protection mechanisms embedded in any component should
be analyzed more accurately. DSM analysis include few metrics for reflecting such violation
of layered design which include 3:
1) Coupled sub-systems: Two entities are coupled when there is an inter-dependency
between them and either have privileged relation over another. The higher number of
coupled execution units, the more probability of security solutions to be ineffective for
the target system. This is because the solutions which are designed to protect the less
privileged component, could themselves be attacked by it. One of the main goals of DSM
analysis is to find out such coupled sub-systems. Figure 3a shows a DSM containing such
units.
2) Removed tears: tears can be seen as a coupling which has been tried to be removed
at design time, however it has not been removed totally. At design time analysis, tearing
is a process in which some feedback marks (tears) are removed from the matrix by adding
some assumptions about the system [EB12] (figure 3b). They often are implemented by
adding a limitation satisfying the made assumptions in the platform. Depending on how
much robust the limit protection has been implemented, the tear can be seen as a weak
point of the platform.
3) Conditional executions: Conditional units can be seen when a component has
privileged relations to multiple other components (figure 3c). From the security point
of view, the base units -unit A in the example- should be designed more robustly or be
defined inside the system TCB. Conditional units below the platform’s DSM diagonal
could be a more severe security threat. This is because such components could violate the
layered design and by passing the layered security view in multiple points.
In continue, we will explain our DSM-based attack vector identification which include
a respective matrix-based metric for each of possible architectural attacks2 (Forristal’s
taxonomy[For11]). Table 1 show these metrics which are explained in continue:
1) Inappropriate General Access to Hardware3: These attacks are often called confused
deputy attack in the mobile security literature. From the DSM point of view, any occupied
cell at the rows belonging to the system software components below the diagonal can
indicate such attack vectors. We have also considered "Interference with Hardware Privilege
Access Enforcement"[For11] attacks as a special case of inappropriate general access.
2) Hardware Reflected Injection4: We will consider the equivalent node-link diagram of
2It is worthy to note that our metrics only indicate potential attack scenario and the possibilty of the
attack in real world depends on some other factors including more fine-grained focus on details, attacker
skills, and etc.
3 "a higher-privileged software layer (i.e. OS or hypervisor) incorrectly grants or proxies general
hardware access to a lower-privileged software layer"[For11].
4The attacking application originates particular malicious data, and that data traverses through the
higher-privileged software stack layers and into the hardware for storage; later, a privileged software layer
receives/retrieves the malicious data from the hardware, and immediately operates upon, interprets, or
otherwise uses the malicious data in an insecure manner leading to a security vulnerability.
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Table 1: Analysis of hardware-involved software attacks by Lamellae
Attack[For11] example Metric definition
Inappropriate Gen-
eral Access to Hard-
ware
CVE-2010-1592 Checking specific cells occupied cell at the rows
belonging to system soft-
ware/firmware components
below the diagonal
Hardware Reflected
Injection
CVE-2010-4530 quadrangular walks anti-clock-wised triangular
walks start and end through
the upper-diagonal part of the
matrix
Access By a Par-
allel Executing En-
tity
CVE-2010-0306 horizontal line horizontal line in the rows in-
cluding computing resources
External Control of
a Hardware Device
CVE-2011-3215 Checking specific cells Xi,j in which i regards to hard-
ware device row, and j is a col-
umn from external hardware in-
terfaces/devices
the DSM occupied cells to find these kinds of injections. Existing relation between two
components is shown via a directed like between two nodes in such graphs 5. Hence such
attack scenarios can be detected by finding all anti-clock-wised triangular walks start and
end through the upper-diagonal part of the matrix in which the middle point of the walk
is at the below of the diagonal.
3) Access By a Parallel Executing Entity: Here we have a row with multiple occupied
cells. Handling such parallel executions in one of the two main tasks of the operating
system. There are also some of micro-architectural mechanisms to handle them at hardware-
level. However the existing vulnerabilities shows that sometimes the mechanisms fail to
handle specific conditions. Hence any horizontal line between occupied cells (excluding
sequential/logical relations) in the rows belong to computing resources can be a potential
parallel executing attack vector and should be monitored more accurately at run-time.
4) External Control of a Hardware Device: An external software component can control
a device in this attacks. Such a software component may enter the system through the
network stack, or by other interfaces with physical access to the system (.e.g. Firewire).
Any Xi,j in which i regards to hardware device row, and j is a column from external
hardware interfaces/devices should be checked for detecting such potential attacks.
5) Unexpected Consequences of Specific Hardware Function6: It is a fact that Lamellae
is designed to prohibit such unexpected consequences. Here we expect the analyzer who
fill the matrix to accurately read between lines of hardware manuals to reflect all possible
privileges and access rights in the matrix.
4 case-study
In this section we will see how the Lamellae can be applied on a system with Intel
x86-64 architecture (corei7 Sandy Bridge). This would enable us to evaluate how much
the framework can cover real rootkits in practice. The motherboard of the system has
a traditional architecture in which south-bridge and north-bridge are separated. Our
first source of study should be the Intel processor’s manual. We have found initial code
execution units could be classified into 17 main classes. In three below subsections we will
review relationships among code execution units classified into hardware, firmware, system
software, and application levels. For each unit two kinds of possible attacks should be
5 More details on such graphs can be read in [Bro16].
6These attacks may occur in condition in which an access to a hardware is granted to a platform’s
component with the " presumption that only particular hardware functionality is exposed, and access to
that specific hardware functionality is not believed to harbor any security concerns"[For11].
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mentioned through the descriptions: Attacks can be sourced by the unit, and also attacks
perform by other units targeting the specific unit. The relationships will be reflected in a
DSM matrix (Table 2). At the end, we will analyze the final DSM matrix from the security
point of view.
4.1 Hardware execution units
Hardware execution units consist of CPU and any device connected to the Central processing
unit on the mother-board. We have excluded other electronic devices. Hardware execution
units include:
- CPU hard-wired code/state: From the security point of view, the CPU includes mainly
hardwired codes as well as configuration registers which if include malicious functionality
(like [KTC+08][BRPB14]) can affect all execution units run on the CPU. Thus the CPU
has logical privileged relation to all other units. As an example the CPU can be configured
to use cache instead of SMRAM in order to help the attacker to implement a SMM rootkit
without requiring modifying the SMI handler in the SMRAM [WR09b]. It also can disable
required security technology like interrupt remapping protection [WR11] which facilitates
some attacks against different components including BIOS, OS and etc. CPU states
however could be set/modified by the platform firmware as well as the system software.
Hence here these execution units have sequential privileged relationship with the CPU state.
For example, recently advanced rootkit has shown the ability of modifying the system
memory layout by installing a kernel module [ZSL+15] (control privileged relationship).
- North bridge: The next execution unit corresponds to the north bridge, which
physically is privileged since it can mediate the data that comes from all other devices
before being received by the CPU.
- North bridge devices: Typically, main memory and graphic hardware are directly
connected to the north bridge. The physical position empowers either rootkits [LLZ+13]
and also security monitor developers to access the main memory (and thus software
components running on the system) by DMA. Recently, stealth GPU-assisted rootkits has
been proposed [BDPV15], which can be fully invisible in the main memory. Another often
ignored privilege relationship is the configuration relation between the devices and the
BIOS code which is described by SIPI attack. In [WR11] it has been shown that a using a
message signaled interrupt (MSI), a device can force the CPU to run the custom start-up
boot code and so by pass the BIOS. In the same time there are many kinds of firmware
and software components have access privilege to the devices.
- Out-of-band management component: Out-of-band (OOB) management is a tech-
nology enabling control and management of an Intel platform independent of the CPU.
Current versions of the technology for intel motherboards contain Intel Management Engine
(ME) which is a small computer able to access the whole system’s memory (excluding some
system-reserved regions), the CPU, and the power management of the two [Rua14]. Hence
it can intercept most of system components by a counter attack (It can inject operations
to the CPU, use its dedicated DMA hardware to read and write to the memory of OS and
applications) [Rua14].
There are discussions about how the technology can be used to implement a rootkit
targeting the CPU, ROM and also RAM of the system [Ste11][SB13][SB12], thus it would
be a threat for all levels of the system. This special position of ME engine, has made it
interesting for malware developers such that "ring -3 rootkits" [TW09] referred to rootkits
residing in it. ME resides in the north-bridge chip set, thus the chip itself has a kind of
physical privileged relationship with it. At the first glance it may seem that the engine is
fully independent of the system, however there are two points it relies on the system BIOS.
The ME boot loader loads its code from the ME ROM and BIOS has temporary sequential
relationship with it when it borrows from the system RAM . Consequently, these memory
pages are potentially accessible by devices which can access the RAM. After some attacks
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shown the possibility of code injection to these BIOS reserved pages [TW09], a new page
integrity schema has been proposed to ME engine. Hence we consider a probability for the
scheme to be bypassed as a result of limitations it has due to performance considerations.
- Southbridge: Southbridge is another chip which connects slower devices (like PCI,
USB, IDE devices, and ROM memories) to the Northbridge. Thus peripheral devices as
well as BIOS chip are under the physical privileged accesses of the bridge.
-Southbridge devices: These devices may include the DMA engines have been used to
access the system main memory as the result of access relationships [AD10][SC13][SHL16].
Here again there is the possibility for SIPI attack mentioned before by the configuration
relation of devices with the BIOS code. System software (OS/hypervisor) is sometimes
is allowed to flash the firmware stored in hardware devices to update their code which is
shown by access relationship inside the matrix.
4.2 Firmware execution units
-Micro-code: One may think that the CPU codes are all hard-wired, however today’s CISC
processors mostly use a microcode-based architecture in order to translate some complex
instructions. It is evident that the microcode modification could modify all levels of code
executions, which run by the processor, thus it provides logical privilege relationship of the
CPU to other codes. For Intel X86, the micro-code which is stored in an internal ROM
chip, is also updatable at boot-time by the system BIOS. Hence, the BIOS code has a
temporary sequential privileged relationship with the system microcode.
- System BIOS: System BIOS code is physically stored in flash chips connected to the
south-bridge, and has an important role in system boot-up. System BIOS is responsible for
hardware self-testing, initialization of the hardware devices, and the OS loading. It is the
first software code run on the system, hence it can be a source of attacks in multiple levels.
The BIOS can intercept configuration of devices, handler for SMI Interrupt [KK15][BSD08],
Measured Launched Environment (MLE), or the system software as it has a sequential
prevalence to all of these components.
- UEFI: UEFI is a newer CPU-independent firmware interface architecture aims to
replace the legacy BIOS. It can be seen as a small OS (C program) running on protected
mode before the main OS. Hence attack vectors for UEFI is similar to the BIOS. Despite,
UEFI also can sit on top of the legacy BIOS.
- Option-ROMs: Option-ROMs which are defined by PCI specifications, which are
firmware components located on each device separately. They are loaded by the system
BIOS at the boot time for providing additional functionality or replaced the existing BIOS
service required by the device.
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In practice, an option ROM can have unrestricted access to the system when run-
ning [Joh13]. These codes have full access to the system and have sequential privileged
relationship with other components loaded into the memory later.
- SMM code: X86 CPUs have a system management operating mode (SMM mode)
to handle the platform specific functionalities in a separated address space (SMRAM)
which is transparent to the system software. In recent years the mode has been focused by
either attackers and also security productions [stm15]. The system management interrupt
(SMI) handler is primarily stored in BIOS and is loaded to the SMARAM at boot-time
(temporary sequential relationship). It is also " neither visible, nor maskable" [stm15] by
the system software as working in a separated processor mode. SMI interrupt can be
generated either by hardware (signaling the SMI pin on the processor) or by the software
(Message Signaled INT). From the security point of view, SMM mode has become a great
source of counter attacks as it can access the memory entirely (control relation). It can be
used as a vector to attack option-ROMs of peripheral devices (like a malicious IOCHECK
[ZWLS14]), hypervisor, operating system, or any kind of user-level applications. It also
has been used to attack the MLE [WR09a].
- Measured launched environment: Intel x86 TXT is a hardware extension which aims
to provide a trusted plat-form by the help of a TPM module. By using the extension,
the processor would be able to verify the system software integrity and the platform
configuration. If the platform passes the verification, then a pre-defined known state of
the platform would be applied to the system. The MLE could be used at boot time or
be a late-launch session inside the operating system. Once the MLE is launched, it can
run an uninterrupted environment for a binary. Although the facility is generally used by
white-hats [GD09][MPP+08], it has been shown [DHWW11] that it can be used also by
black-hats to run an anti-analysis malware with no interruption or possibility of analysis.
Though, this control relation could be a threat itself for higher level units.
4.3 Software execution units
- Hypervisor: In X86 architecture, hypervisor can work either by hardware or para-
virtualization. In either of cases the VMM has logical privileged relationship with the
units run later inside the virtualized environment. This relation has made it possible to
implement stealth malware attacks [Ska07]. The logical dependency is especially interesting
for the attacker who want to hijack the current operating system by installing a hypervisor
below the OS (blue-pilling) [RT08]. Though the SMM code has been proposed as an
integrity checker for the hypervisor [WSG10][ANW+10], it can also be used as a counter
attack to the hypervisor because of the existing control relation.
- Operating system: The OS inherently has a complete control of the execution units
run inside the box as the result of logical relation to other user-level unit. In addition,
currently ACPI power management is supported by most of the operating systems will
introduce new set of threats from the security view. The ACPI scripts run by the AML
interpreter of the operating systems are expected to be used for power control. However,
they can disable security functionalities implemented by a separated hardware devices or by
interrupt remapping [WR11]. They also can run other arbitrary code as a cross-platform
rootkit [Hea06]. Thus devices have access relationship to the OS. The scripts in turn can
be re-written at boot-time by the BIOS (sequential relation).
- User-level OS libraries: Unlike traditional monolithic operating systems, there is a
growing trend toward minimizing the kernel and to outsource some OS services to the
user-level execution units. The Libraries have logical privileged relationship to ordinary
application programs.
- Run-time environments: Sand-boxes, containers, and run-time frameworks are exam-
ples of runtime environments manage the code running inside. Thus these are very similar
to ordinary applications from the security view. There are special types of rootkits called
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managed code rootkits [Met10], which aim to change the behavior of the environment.
Since the runtime environments executes at user-level, such rootkits are in fact user-level
rootkits that look like kernel-level ones from inside of the environment (access relation).
- User-level applications: User-level application (either interpreted or native) has access
relationship with the user-level OS components. In fact, applications have same privilege
level to the user-level OS libraries, hence they can use the legitimate APIs or OS facilities
in order to penetrate into the OS by a user-level rootkit [DBL09]. Although installing
malicious kernel modules in order to penetrate into the kernel requires administrator access,
however this is a common procedure during application installation. Hence this is a weak
protective relation that can be easily bypassed by kernel-level rootkit [Pel04][Blu12].
4.4 DSM processing and analysis
After raw insertion of mentioned privileged relations into the matrix, we have applied
the rules of sequencing and integration discussed in section 3.3. As a result, we will see
different parts of the operating system (including kernel and drivers) made a single circuit.
Table 2 shows the final DSM matrix. As the table suggests there are multiple execution
units (like native and interpreted applications, OS components, and etc.) which have been
integrated into a same layer.
The upper triangular part of matrix enables the analyzer to find a primary layered view
of the target system. For example, since the option-ROMs are placed at the bottom of the
OS, the analyzer would note that it would not be sufficient to protect the application’s
memory after OS has been load-ed. Instead, it is required to ensure that the OS has not
been compromised by DMA attacks (even though the initial OS and the boot process are
trusted).
The lower triangular part of matrix, reflect the design violations of this initial layered
view. These violations result in more complex vulnerabilities which often are not easy to
handle. Below, we will analyze the matrix by the approach proposed before to see the
design vulnerabilities as the result of elements below the diagonal.
First of all, we analyze platform couplings (figure 3a). We have found the following
coupled units which can violate the pure layered representation inside the matrix:
1) Update couplings: There are multiple update couplings in the system where the
higher unit is able to update the lower one. One of the most threatening one is BIOS-CPU
coupling. The platform firmware (BIOS/UEFI) is executed under the control of the CPU
hardware. However, in X86 the system firmware in turn has sequential privileged relation
to the CPU microcode. In fact, the system has been designed in a way that the firmware
updates the microcode and initializes the CPU registers. This will make it hard to make a
chain of trust based on the correct functionality of the CPU and the CPU cannot check
the integrity of the firmware. This is be-cause the CPU itself may have been attacked by
the BIOS. Although there is no implemented microcode attack against Intel microcode
updates, the coupling has been exploited in an AMD processor before [CA14]. Other than
microcode update, there are other similar cases including updating BIOS/UEFI by the
system software, updating the OS by the application and etc.
2) OS-application coupling: As we expect the OS has logical privileged relationship
with the applications. However, the ability to install a driver in x86 architecture by admin
privilege, enable applications to penetrate into the kernel. This will violate many security
assumptions about the user-level apps. This weak protection (alert dialogue to be verified
by the user) can be bypassed by social engineering techniques to convince the user to
install malicious drivers.
3) ME-platform coupling: As was noted, the management engine of the Intel has its
own memory; however, it also uses a borrowed memory from the system’s RAM. Hence
considering the threat of access control to be bypassed (has been shown to be possible
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Figure 4: Graphical representation of architecture embedded in table 2
before [TW09]), all software units which are able to access the main memory can modify
this borrowed section.
Another point which was noted in section 3 is the removed tears (figure 3b). The final
matrix shows that a coupling can be seen in between the Intel MLE and the SMI code
runs at system management mode. MLE is designed in a way that it does not rely on any
code which has not been measured before. However, while the MLE late launch session is
sequentially run after BIOS, the SMI handler (as a part of BIOS (can run then inside the
MLE independently. Evidently this can neutralize the measured environment of the MLE.
The problem has been raised because the hardware manufacturer assumes the handler to
be trusted and benign. Late after about a decade SMI attacks have been revealed, Intel is
trying to tear the coupling and recently released a specification for a monitor called SMI
Transition Monitor (STM) [stm15], in order to control the assumption and to monitor SMI
handler when an MLE is launched.
Conditional units are the third item should be considered (figure 3c). As an example
by considering the SMM column below the diagonal, it can be seen how adding a new
mode can violate the layered architecture of the system.
To better understand the system, it may be useful to convert the matrix to a graphical
representation. A fully layered system (fully upper triangular DSM) would be easy to
represent graphically. Each row in DSM matrix would form a layer on top of its lower
row. Layers which are not necessary for a system to work, they can be represented in
an L form (for example a system may or may not have a VMM). Rows which include
some layered-view violations should be placed beside each other as the result of couplings
exist among them. Graphical view in figure 4 has no more information than the matrix,
but maybe it can better show how much the primary fully layered imagination about the
system was true in practice.
As it was noted in section 3.3, the analysis can be continued in a recursive manner if
lower granularity is desired.As an example, let’s consider a threats at UEFI level. After
analyzing the security of a code resides in UEFI position in the matrix, analysis can be
continued to focus on twelve stages of boot sequence in the mentioned platform.
Finally by the platform’s DSM, one can think about the questions mentioned in section
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3.1. As an example a critical question is about which platform components are better
locations to host security solutions such that the solution can not be bypassed? The matrix
shows that - even if we trust the hardware components- none of software or firmware
components are appropriate locations for an ideal security solution. This is because there
are layered violation in all rows of such components. When discussing hardware, - other
than the CPU- the north-bridge looks to be an ideal place in our case. In fact, if one can
assume the CPU in the TCB, north-bridge chipset is the most privileged place with no
below diagonal tear. This maybe the reason why Intel has chosen the chipset for placing
AMT engines.
5 EVALUATION
In this section we will evaluate the Lamellae based on the case-study mentioned in section
4. We have achieved the DSM matrix of the target system which reflects the security
architecture of the platform. A serious challenge for evaluating any APT-related research
is the lack of available instances occurred in the wild. Low-level platform attacks are
infrequent among huge amount of malware detected every day. Hence it is not trivial to
evaluate the Lamaellae based on these kind of targeted attacks.
Despite, we have gathered disclosed platform attacks and filtered those which works
on a system with mentioned specification in section 4. We have also excluded those who
solely rely on vulnerable implementation of some system component. Table 5 shows how
the possibility of these attacks is provable by relations and metrics defined by Lamellae
framework.
As the table suggests, platform attacks often occur in the context of nation-state cyber
espionage and thus often remain undiscovered for years. Hence having the ability to
identify chinks in the system’s armour would enable us to forecast the possibility of such
attacks.
6 Discussion and future works
Architectural attacks cannot be covered neither by hardware, nor by software security
deciplines which analyze the SW/HW separately. Hence it is important to have architecture
analysis routines against such attacks. Despite, there are multiple points about Lamellae
to be considered.
First, Lamellae is intended to identify vulnerable architectural weak points exist in each
platform by design. Although applying changes in the platform’s design is not possible
by the end-user party, the framework enables the security analyzer to locate required
security solutions/monitors at appropriate points of the system. It would be also possible
to compare platforms based on their architectural security features.
Lamellae basic use-case is to model architectural threats against computing platforms.
Despite when considering the existance of System-on-Chips (SoC) inside a platfrom,
repeating the method recursively can be used also for finding some micro-architectural
attacks. In fact, Lamellae is able to reveal attacks which exploits inter-relationship between
components (through modules, SoC, FPGASoC, and etc.). Hence attacks which targets
physical features of a single components (.e.g. Rowhammer [?]), or micro-architectural
implementation of an ISA code (.e.g. Out-of-Order Execution [LSG+18] attacks) are not
in the scope of Lamellae.
Another important point is that the SSA of a given platform which is made by Lamellae,
can only represent the available information (by official documentation, reverse engineering
efforts or etc.) about the platforms component. Hence it is no guarantee for the matrix to
be complete. The origin of this problem is in current abstract HW-SW contract which
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is limited to the processor ISA. Recently there have been arguments [Hei17][LPAF+18]
about insufficiently of the ISA and the need to more exposing contract.
One may argue that DSM analysis would not be easy when having a platform with
many components. In such cases one can use tools exist to support DSM analysis (.e.g.
Lattix7 and NDepends8). This would be applicable when requiring to conform a more
fine-grained analysis in a recursive manner for a platform.
Finally, Lamellae requires ad-hoc procedure for extracting initial set of code execution
units of the platform. While we have suggested best practices to help doing this phase, we
are working on a comprehensive ontology which can better guide users.
7 conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the lack of a threat modeling scheme which is applicable
for considering architectural attacks against a computing platform.
We have proposed Lamellae, a platform threat modeling framework, which leverages
privileged relations between platform components in order to achieve a multi-layered model
of the system. Using the Design Structure Matrix (DSM) as the basic structure, we have
altered the DFD representation by SSA-based DSM of the platform. We also used our
taxonomy of original relations exploited during a platform attack, DSM-based analysis,
and matrix-based metrics in order to detect threats against the platform.
Borrowing the threat modeling concept from the software security and the DSM analysis
from the system’s engineering literature, we have tried to adapt the existing analysis ideas
to be applicable for finding architecturally weak points in a given computing platform. At
the end, we have analyzed the security of an X86-64 architecture as a case-study.
8 APPENDIX A: BEST PRACTICES FOR IDENTIFY-
ING PLATFORM COMPONENTS
• Start with the main board of the system, you can find a general block diagram of
hardware components at the data-sheet/manual of the board. Identify components
and their available interfaces from the manual.
• Do a further search about IC numbers you have found in the previous step. Look
for the available information about their probable processor/controller and their
capabilities.
• Boot sequence is a golden key word which helps you to find available data about
hardware and firmware components and the sequential privileges in your platform.
Even if the boot sequence was not mentioned from the manufacturer parties, you
may find some information from reverse engineering results on the web.
• Enumerate CPU operational modes and different codes available for the modes.
• Enumerate all kinds of privileged codes can run on your CPU. This may include OS,
hypervisor, interrupts, etc.
• Enumerate all hardware extensions supported by your specific CPU, software supports
for the extensions, and available security reviews and attacks for them.
• Try to classify found components under user-level software, system software, firmware,
and hardware categories.
7http://lattix.com/dependency-structure-matrix
8https://www.ndepend.com/docs/dependency-structure-matrix-dsm
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